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Book Review
The Moral Decision; Right and Wrong
in the Light of American Law
By Edmond N. Cahn
Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1955. Pp. 342. Hardback:
$17.50; Paperback: $6.95.
Edmond Cahn seems to set out his purpose in the first
sentence of The Moral Decision: "What moral guides can be
found in American law?"' But in fact Cahn tells us very little
about American law as such. He discusses twenty-one cases at
some length, but they are not presented as representative of
American law nor are they. Sometimes Cahn begins his discus-
sion openly where law ends. At the end of this book, one is not
prepared to judge whether American law on the whole is good,
bad or indifferent. Nor can one say what moral guides are to be
found generally in American law. While the reader is not told
much about law, the reader is told about Cahn's moral theory, in
substance and perhaps more importantly to Cahn, in method.
Cahn does not so much describe moral decision-making as prac-
tice it. The reader observes Cahn entering into reasoned moral
discourse about these twenty-one cases: not right and wrong in
the light of American law, but rather, right and wrong in the
light of Edmond Cahn.
There is no mystery about why Cahn wants the reader to
learn his approach to moral discourse. He wants readers to
become better able to make moral choices in their lives. There is,
however, a more subtle and controversial aspect to Cahn's sug-
gestions about making moral decisions. Cahn assumes that
judges will often base decisions on moral principles. Cahn would
1. E.N. CAHN, THE MORAL DECISION; RIGHT AND WRONG IN THE LIGHT OF
AMERICAN LAW 3 (1955).
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like to improve their moral reasoning as well. But Cahn never
specifies the conditions under which moral values should control
or affect a judicial decision. Cahn's views on the proper relation-
ship between law and morality are not developed, but hinted at,
in The Moral Decision.
I. CAHN'S VIEWS ON MORALITY
A. Cahn's Moral Methodology
Cahn's contribution to moral theory in The Moral Decision is
his suggestion that there are specific methods by which reason-
ing about moral issues can be improved. Cahn refers to the
"moral constitution" as the way that people make moral
judgments, and suggests methods, many of which Cahn claims
are present in legal decision-making, by which the performance
of the moral constitution can be improved.
The moral constitution, by which we are to understand "con-
science doing its work,"2 involves three human characteristics.
First, we "dramatize ourselves."3 Second, we project ourselves
into the lives and roles of others.4 Third, we have a " 'sense of
wrong,'" by which Cahn means a biological reaction to an act we
consider to be wrong.' We are walking lie detectors, incapable of
acting in ways we consider to be wrong without registering
physical changes. These three characteristics enable us to
engage in moral reasoning.
Cahn believes that legal methods can be of aid in developing
better moral decision-making, in improving the moral constitu-
tion. He identifies four attributes of law and legal process that
can teach us about the "process by which moral decisions are ar-
rived at."6 These four attributes are the mode of trial, law's pro-
fessional discipline, law's social function, and control of official
force. Presumably, we are to practice these attributes in our
moral decisions, and Cahn proceeds to do so in the substantive
moral discussions in the book.
Of these four attributes, the mode of trial seems to be the
2. Id. at 16.
3. Id. at 17.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 18.
6. Id. at 111.
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most important to Cahn because a trial makes values concrete
that might otherwise exist only in the realm of the abstract. In
order to understand our relationship to moral values (dramatiza-
tion), view sympathetically the dilemma of others (projection) and
confront wrong (the sense of wrong), we must consider actual,
human behavior. Thus trials, which involve evaluation of specific
human conduct in a particular context, aid the operation of the
moral constitution.'
Attributes of law other than the trial mode do not make as
clear a contribution to Cahn's moral methodology. The profes-
sional discipline of lawyers is said to impart precision to decision-
making, which helps develop the sense of wrong.' The social
function of law, by which Cahn refers to the obligation of a legal
decision maker to render decisions with reasonable swiftness,
forces the moral decision maker to confront difficult choices.
Finally, law's control over official force serves as an example to
moral decision-making because responsibility for actual results
tempers law's judgment.' Cahn criticizes irresponsible uto-
pianism in moral judgment. He feels that to reach fair moral
judgment we must presume that our decisions will have reper-
cussions. The weight of this responsibility develops sympathy for
human weakness.
B. The Substance of Cahn's Moral Philosophy
Cahn's moral method is highly subjective, and thus his content
is extremely idiosyncratic. The roles of men and women and of
rich and poor are filtered through a lens of sympathetic but very
traditional assumptions. The book was written in 1955. While it
is not embarrassing to reach Cahn today, time has rendered his
blind spots more apparent to us than are our own.
7. Cahn might mean here "a case" rather than the mode of trial itself
because he does not refer to any of the attributes of "trial". In a later section,
though, Cahn suggests also that criminal trial procedures, the specific protec-
tions given to the accused, such as the adversary system, hostility to presump-
tions, testing of evidence, and the reasonable doubt standard of proof, can aid in
moral decision-making by illustrating a "due process of moral decision." Id. at
252.
8. CAHN, supra note 1, at 53. This precision changes the vague sense of
wrong into "the firmer and more precise sense of injustice." Id. (emphasis in
original).
9. Id. at 55.
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Some of Cahn's views are attributable, presumably, to
peculiarities in his experience. For example, Cahn has a fixed
idea about the personality of artists:
One of the reasons why an artist's business methods are so
often the despair of merchants and bankers (not to mention
the artist's wife) is his responsiveness to a higher plane of
integrity, which sometimes makes him feel sincerely indif-
ferent to the lower one. 10
No male artist, whatever his age or eminence, fails to re-
spond throughout his being to an apt compliment,
preferably one from a pretty girl (but then any girl who
gives a compliment is very likely to seem pretty at the
time)."
[WIhat the artist sees in himself as sacred personality he
usually sees in his fellow-artists as mere pretense and vanity
12
I refer to the peculiar image Cahn has of artists not as a
serious criticism, of course. The role of the artist is not central
to this book and Cahn is often more whimsical than serious.
Nevertheless, moral judgments of the type Cahn endorses-case-
bound discussion of specific human relationships -are bound to
bring prejudices to the surface if the writer is candid. The ex-
treme subjectivity of Cahn's method should be remembered, par-
ticularly because, in general, Cahn's judgments seem so fair and
reasonable as to appear somehow natural and unchallengeable.
The essence of Cahn's moral substance can be summarized
best by the words generosity and honor. The generosity flows
from Cahn's basic humaneness, his sympathy for the human con-
dition. For long-term human relationships to remain healthy,
what is needed is not righteousness, but "administrative"
morality.13 This kind of morality is flexible and adaptive; it does
not call for a decision about who is right and who is wrong, but,
rather, tries to accommodate differences."' Cahn's description of
10. Id. at 126.
11. Id. at 205.
12. Id. at 206.
13. Id. at 115.
14. Id. at 15.
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marriage captures his general unwillingness to judge people har-
shly:
For a sense, every lasting marriage comprises an endless
series of reconciliations, most of them picayune and
unspoken, a series of occasions through which tears, mostly
unwept, may gradually solder the real bond of matrimony,
which will thus become the end-product of the relation. And
though forgiveness is indispensable to this process, let no
one assume that a man must be adjudged guilty before he
can be forgiven. He may need forgiveness most of all
because, without his being consulted, a dream was dreamed
about him once and now he does not seem to incarnate that
dream.... It is a wise policy to start with the assumption
that both spouses, having the usual traits of human beings,
are sufficiently guilty in one or more of a thousand possible
respects that neither has the right to sit in judgment on the
other.15
Cahn finds human behavior rarely to be evil as such. In Cahn's
view human life is often, perhaps usually, not a series of choices
between good and evil, but a series of choices between good or
evil on the one hand, and mere "pettiness, smallness of spirit,
[and] parvanimity"' 6 on the other. Cahn does not expect people to
be good all the time; in fact he says we need an occasional
"healthy respite" even from trying to be good." What kindles
Cahn's indignation as much or more than greed, selfishness and
other vices is small-minded righteousness of the type that would,
for example, point flashlights into the room of an unmarried cou-
ple engaged in innocent lovemaking. 8
Cahn's spirit of generosity is welcome instruction in the skills
of living together. Cahn does not deny, however, that some
behavior is evil and that compromise is not always to be sought.
Cahn is at his most specific in castigating evil in his treatment of
the defendant's actions in Tuttle v. Buck. 9 In this case, a local
barber "somehow incurred the emnity of CasSius [Buck], a rich
15. Id. at 115.
16. Id. at 208.
17. Id. at 193.
18. Id. at 88-89.
19. 197 Minn. 145, 119 N.W. 946 (1909).
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local banker."'  The banker set out to drive Tuttle out of
business by setting up a rival barber shop.
Cahn does not trust rich people as a group. His general conclu-
sion about the rich is that wealth creates power and that the use
of power always raises a moral issue. But wealth and private
property are not evil as such. Cahn concludes, however, that the
banker's viciousness in this instance is immoral.
But such clear condemnation is rare in Cahn. There is always
in Cahn a tension between his desire for peace, his belief that
people are not inherently evil (his generosity) on the one hand,
and his absolute hostility to oppression in any form, as in Tuttle,
on the other. One example of this tension is Cahn's defense of
Brown v. Board of Education,21 and specifically the decision's
gradualism.22 Cahn hoped the spirit of compromise that he iden-
tified in Brown would lead to conciliation between opposing
social interests. The ensuing history of massive resistance sug-
gests to Professor Charles Black that compromise created prob-
lems rather than solving them.23 Cahn's hopes for us turned out,
perhaps, to surpass our capabilities.
The reference point that gives standards to Cahn's moral
thinking is honor. By honor Cahn seems to mean a code of civic
virtue. Cahn refers often to attributes such as "good taste,"' a
"good name,"25 and "good character"2 as worth having and seek-
ing. These attributes do not tell us what honorable behavior is in
a particular situation. Cahn would suggest that if we have a
doubt, we probably are not acting honorably. He returns often to
the considered judgment of others whom we respect as a test of
honor: 7 Dishonorable behavior is also associated with public
20. CAHN, supra note 1, at 135.
21. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
22. Cahn refers to the "effective gradual adjustment" language in the
Court's call for rearguement on the issue of a proper remedy. 347 U.S. at
495-96. Cahn was aware of Brown II, Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294
(1955), and its "with all deliberate speed" formula, id. at 301, but he felt that
this merely rendered the suggestion of gradualism contained in Brown I "ex-
plicit". CAHN, supra note 1, at 326 n.5.
23. Black, Law and an Art, Yale Law Report, 12, 14-15 (1979) (Reprint of
University of Tennessee, Alumni Distinguished Lecture in Jurisprudence
(1978)).
24. CAHN, supra note 1, at 10.
25. Id. at 204.
26. Id. at 25.
27. Id. at 204.
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judgment. Cahn is disdainful, for example, of men (seeking honor,
seemingly a male characteristic) who sue for money damages in
alienation of affections suits. Such a suit is based on a
"philistine" perception that the loss of a customer and the loss of
a wife are equivalent. One cannot salve one's honor with money:
"He may have to hire a housekeeper as a substitute for his wife's
domestic services; but if he accepts dollars as a substitute for
her sexual fidelity, what do we call him?"' 8
Sometimes honor is not based upon the opinion of others, but,
in an analogous way, our own best judgment of ourselves. In reply
to the question "why men ought to practice honesty in paying
taxes," but which could serve as easily to explain why we should
engage generally in right conduct, Cahn answers, "[Tihere is the
voice of individual honor, which needs no cue from political
democracy or social solidarity to speak its part. It appeals to a
man's personal pride and self-esteem, regarding them as quite
sufficient in themselves to prevent his sliding down the declivity
of fraud.""
Cahn's unwillingness to specify any standards of right and
wrong is consistent with his moral case method in which moral
insight arises from ad hoc reflection upon specific situations and
relationships. But notwithstanding Cahn's powerful intuition, the
reader can hardly avoid looking for patterns of right and wrong.
When, for instance, Cahn celebrates the "ideal level of economic
conduct" law imposes upon fiduciaries, 0 the reader is left to
wonder whether it should not then be considered immoral for
anyone to take advantage of others, in the marketplace or other-
wise.
But Cahn does not attack the market, nor any other existing
social institution. In discussing conduct that is wrong, which is
Cahn's stated focus,3' Cahn is preoccupied with the unusual, the
unusually evil mental state, or the case of market breakdown,
the monopoly. In the case of the mere day-to-day routine in
which people actually work and live, in which there are not
usually evil bankers or oppressive monopolists, but just people
trying to make their own way and who nevertheless hurt other
28. Id. at 106.
29. Id. at 174.
30. Id. at 149.
31. Id. at 11.
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people quite badly, Cahn has little to say about moral judgment.
In this world, our world, Cahn's generosity obscures moral
reasoning.2
To see this problem in bolder relief consider again Cahn's con-
demnation of the banker in Tuttle v. Buck. The banker is con-
demned because of his desire to cause harm to Tuttle. But the
banker is, as Cahn admits, a simple case for everyone.' The
more difficult, and more usual, case is presented by one who
takes advantage of opportunities without any spiteful motive,
but who knows that harm is likely to result.
One day a new barber will move into town. He may be more
attractive, a better dresser, a better advertiser, or perhaps even
a better barber. It may just be that he will be willing to charge
less. Tuttle will lose customers. Or perhaps one day a banker
who bears Tuttle no ill-will will decide that Tuttle is a bad risk
and will shut off credit. The result of these actions will be the
same as the consequence of an evil person's oppression: Tuttle's
business will be ruined. When are we free to better ourselves at
the expense of others?
Cahn has no answer to this question beyond the obvious obser-
vation that it is not always immoral to seek self-advancement.
32. For the insights of an economist on the issue of evil conduct in the
market, see Demsetz, Barriers to Entry, 72 AMERICAN ECON. REV. 47, 54-56
(1982). Professor Demsetz uses Tuttle v. Buck to illustrate a distinction between
consumption activity, where malice should not be tolerated, and monopolization,
where, at least on economic grounds, motive should be discounted.
Cahn's implicit view that immorality is often or usually a matter of the state
of mind with which a person acts, rather than a matter of an action undertaken,
has its parallel in present-day jurisprudence. The search for motivation has led
the United States Supreme Court to create the concept of intent to segregate
or discriminate in many civil rights cases. See, e.g., Keyes v. School Dist., 413
U.S. 189 (1973) and Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). The search for
motivation is not limited to the civil rights area. See Oregon v. Kennedy, 50
U.S.L.W. 4544 (1982) (intent to cause mistrial). The search for intent is applied
as well in the statutory area. See American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 50
U.S.L.W. 4464 (1982).
This purpose- or motive-centered jurisprudence has received a great deal of
criticism both because identifying one purpose seems an incoherent task, see
Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional
Motive, 1971 SuP. CT. REV. 95; Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, 56 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 469, 477-88 (1981), and because a purpose is difficult to prove. See Karst,
The Costs of Motive-Centered Inquiry, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1163 (1978).
Essentially under the motive test, liability for an action turns on the glee with
which one anticipated a result.
33. CAHN, supra note 1, at 140.
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For Cahn, the "market", where self-advancement is sought usually
at the expense of others, generally enforces a minimally accept-
able level of behavior. But in a world in which an "ordinary"
decision by a steel manufacturer to close a steel mill in order to
produce more cheaply in a right-to-work state can ruin the lives
of thousands. It is not evident that the "normal market" is ever,
let alone usually, a guide to right and wrong conduct. The prob-
lem of defining right and wrong conduct in the world is surely as
difficult as Cahn says. Perhaps selfishness is not only inevitable
in people, but so valuable to the community that the market, as
an institution, is morally justified. But this is an argument to be
made, not assumed. It is in the evaluation of powerful social in-
stitutions that moral theory is most valuable. Cahn fails to pose
any challenge because cases and statutes, the context from
which Cahn's discussions proceed, rarely question the legitimacy
of the powerful.
II. CAHN'S VIEW ON LAW AND MORALITY
Because Cahn reserves condemnation for a narrow set of cir-
cumstances, one would expect the relationship between law and
morality to be set out clearly; law should condemn immoral con-
duct. In fact, The Moral Decision, a book that purports to be
about the relationship between law34 and morality, does not
clarify the relationship between the two.
Cahn discusses the difference between law and morality in
Part I of the book. 5 He begins by rejecting two popular distinc-
tions between the two: that law enforces minimum standards of
behavior as opposed to morality's standard of an ideal human be-
ing, and that law is preoccupied with external conduct whereas
morality is concerned with subjective intent. Cahn argues in
response to the first position that both law and morals enforce
codes of behavior relative to a particular time. In both, standards
of acceptable behavior change. In rejecting the second distinc-
tion, Cahn points out that law often is concerned with subjective
34. I am never sure what Cahn means by "law", and it is beyond my scope
to attempt clarification here. I will assume that Cahn intends to include a wide
range of sources of formally defined norms, including statutes, case decisions,
regulations, and so forth. At times, however, Cahn appears to be referring
simply to decisions by judges.
35. CAHN, supra note 1, at 140.
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intent, and that preoccupation with states of mind would tend
"to indict the whole of mankind. 'a
In the end Cahn does not attempt to explain the difference
between law and morality. Cahn concludes that there are moral
values within law and outside law. "The only practical difference
between them is the respective methods by which they are en-
forced.""7 Whatever the merits of this observation, it does not ex-
plain what the content of law either is or ought to be. To what
extent should law reflect moral judgment?
There is no doubt that Cahn thinks there is a necessary role
for moral values in law. Furthermore, Cahn also clearly believes
that there is a great deal of valid moral insight already expressed
in legal principles. Nevertheless, one is hard-pressed to say when
moral principles should be embodied in legal norms in Cahn's
view. For instance, from Cahn's discussion of Post v. Jones,' one
might conclude that at the least, law should not condone truly
oppressive behavior. In Post, the crew and cargo of a grounded
and stranded ship, the Richmond, were rescued. The rescuers
bought the Richmond's whale oil at a bargain price. After all
were returned safely to land, the Richmond's owners repudiated
the sale and were upheld by the United States Supreme Court.
Cahn describes this case as representing the moral obligation
law places upon a monopolist who alone can supply what others
need. When circumstances create a condition in which one party
is at the mercy of another party, the monopolist is "not permit-
ted to follow the ways of the market place and squeeze the final
drop of profit out of my necessity; (he) is required, on the con-
trary, to exercise restraint, honor and self discipline." '39
But juxtaposed to Post, in the same chapter, Cahn is content
that law does not penalize the "good samaritan" who smokes a
cigarette calmly while a few feet away someone drowns. 0 Cahn
clearly views such inaction as morally reprehensible. He simply
considers it not "socially expedient to annex a legal sanction." 41
36. Id. at 46. Cahn obliquely criticizes preoccupation with subjective men-
tal states in moral theory as well in this section; but, as discussed above, he
does not seem to take this criticism to heart.
37. Id. at 47.
38. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 618 (1856).
39. CAHN, supra note 1, at 24-42.
40. Id. at 190-92.
41. Id. at 191.
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Cahn is well aware that law serves goals other than rendering
moral judgment upon the behavior of a litigant, and cannot
always condemn the wrong. In fact, Cahn seems to approve of
law's other goals. The best example of Cahn's broad views on
what law should seek to accomplish is his treatment of Railway
Co. v. Stout.42 In this case, at least as Cahn presents the facts, a
"typical boy" was permitted to recover damages for an injury
sustained while visiting a railroad depot. The fact that the boy
was trespassing did not bar recovery. Cahn considers this to be
an admirable decision because it recognizes the need of young
people to be young-to explore with intensity and irresponsibility.'
He criticizes the later case of United Zinc and Chemical v.
Britt," because in that case Justice Holmes failed to appreciate
the "universal habits" of children to search, wander and venture
on.
45
The discussion is inconsistent with any insistence that law
should serve always to advance the community's sense of moral
behavior. In Stout, both parties appear to be morally blameless.
The railroad must pay damages not because it acted in an im-
moral way, but because the boy was innocent and was injured. It
is important to note that Cahn's analysis does not presuppose
negligence by the railroad. It is based wholly upon the boy's in-
nocent behavior. It would not be immoral, in Cahn's view, for
society to hold the railroad free of liability and to pay for the
boy's injuries in some other way.
The same ambivalence about the proper relationship between
law and moral values afflicts Cahn's discussion about how judges
should decide cases. The Moral Decision is not so much a book
about law as it is a book about the decisions and insights of
American judges. Cahn sees law, and by law he seems to mean
legal opinions in specific cases, as a device to teach about the
good.4" His own discussions are "prism[s]" that reveal "an entire
spectrum of moral forces.""7 His discussions seem to be examples
for judges of how to reason morally so as to teach society.
But Cahn does not resolve an ambiguity in the role of the
42. 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 745 (1873).
43. CAHN, supra note 1, at 74.
44. 258 U.S. 268 (1922).
45. CAHN, supra note 1, at 75-76.
46. Id. at 3-5.
47. Id. at 4.
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judge that echoes the issue of the role of morality in law. It is
clear that in Cahn's view the judge is not free, and should not be
free, always to follow a personal sense of morality. Thus, moral
reasons for a legal outcome might be "far in the background" 8
compared to legal reasons. In Rachel v. State," city detectives
peered into, and ultimately broke into, an unmarried man's
apartment and arrested the man and his unmarried girlfriend
who were in bed together. Oklahoma did not have a statute
outlawing fornication itself. The Criminal Court of Appeals of
Oklahoma reversed convictions for injuring public morals
because "whatever they had done had been done in private."10
Cahn considers the method of prosecution rather than the act of
lovemaking to be immoral, but states that if Oklahoma had had a
statute making fornication a crime, the convictions would have
been upheld, a limitation upon the judges he does not condemn.51
Cahn would not abandon us to a judicial moralist hegemony. He
seems to agree that most choices judges make should be controlled
by a legislature.
Nevertheless, Cahn assumes as well that judges will rely upon
their own moral values in deciding cases. Cahn defines the wise
judge as one who is able to separate "good from evil."52 Cahn says a
court trial serves "one main objective: finding out what a litigant
deserves in connection with some particular transaction. .... 53
Cahn quotes, with obvious approval, John Chipman Gray's obser-
vation that "many cases should be decided by the courts on no-
tions of right and wrong.""
I am not going to attempt to resolve the unresolved in Cahn.
It is our time, not his, that has rendered the relationship be-
tween law and morality, between institutional values and the
judge's moral views, increasingly problematic by giving law so
much to do. Lawyers have decided that cases should be used to
maximize wealth, provide social insurance, regulate commercial
transactions and so forth. We have created conflicts between law
48. Id. at 145.
49. 107 P.2d 813 (Okla. 1940).
50. CAHN, supra note 1, at 88.
51. Id. at 89.
52. Id. at 290.
53. Id. at 117.
54. Id. at 302.
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and morality, or at least created ever more legal contexts in
which moral judgment is not seen as important.
Cahn does have a final word of insight about the role of the
judge, however. Cahn would not be opposed necessarily to our
use of the judiciary to analyze problems of pollution, to solve
cost benefit puzzles, or to restructure the communications in-
dustry. But he might believe that such assignments, if they
predominate, represent the waste of a precious resource-judg-
ment. In Cahn's view, the judge is not a technician, but rather
one who seeks to understand the parties in the case,55 "to see
through illusions to the true circumstances that lie beneath and
beyond."' Cahn might say that to ask whether there is a
relationship between the judge and moral judgment and to seek
to specify the content of such relationship, is to ask the wrong
questions. In the trial courtroom, at least, the judge is always,
and in every case, called upon to understand the relationship of
the parties who are before the court. A judge can only know
these others by the methods of moral decision-making Cahn
describes as the moral constitution: dramatization, projection
and the sense of wrong. Thus, the search for truth, always the
judge's task, cannot be distinguished from the search for the
good.
Bruce S. Ledewitz*
55. Id. at 148.
56. Id. at 290.
* The reviewer is an Associate Professor of Law, Duquesne University
School of Law.
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